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The Politics of Authenticity in Postmodern 
Rock Culture: The Case of Negativland 
and The Letter 'U' and the Numeral '2' 
Andrew Herman and John M. Sloop 
0-Based on recent concerns with the notion of authenticity and effective politics in 
contemporary popular culture and scholarship on culture, this essay uses a case study of the 
legal and popular controversy surrounding the Negativland recording, "The Letter 'lj' and 
the Number '2 '. " The analysis points to the organic development of alternative logics in the 
changing landscape of popular culture. Moreover, we point to the relationship between the 
''pastiche'' style of the Negativland recording as a metaphor for authenticity and justice in 
postmodern rock culture. 
I have often recalled with fondness and 
admiration what Kant has said about ethics 
and the stars. Nothing so filled Kant with 
awe than the starry skies above and the 
moral law within, the stars being for Kant 
(and Aristotle too) obedient to the highest 
and most surpassing lawfulness, and Law 
being for Kant a kind of star to guide us 
through the swirl of appearances .... To 
suffer a disaster is to lose one's star (dis-
astrum), to be cut loose from one's guiding 
or lucky light. Laying claim to neither the 
logos nor the nomos of the stars, I suffer a 
dtsastronomic, disastrolog1cal, deconstruc-
tive setback.... It is not a question of 
knowing what to put in their place, but of 
Andrew Herman is assistant proftssor o[sociol-
ogy and cultural studies at Drake University. 
John M Sloop is assistant proftssor o[communi-
cation studies at Vanderbilt University. 
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 
'j ( (9) --' 0 
just getting along without such a place, of 
conceding that things are just "dec en-
tered," "disseminated," "disastered." Still, 
I would say, obligation happens, the obliga-
tion of me to you and of both of us to 
others. It is all around us, on every side, 
constantly tugging at our sleeves, calling 
on us for a response. In the midst of a 
disaster. 
-John Caputo (1993, p. 6) 
Keep Reaching for the Stars! 
-Casey Kasem 
Our U2 was a spy plane full of secrets 
intruding into the self-righteous and com-
placent image-world of the polite pop of 
the stars. We did it as an example of some-
thing not being what it seems to be. We did 
it because we are all subject to too much 
media image mongering. We did it did it 
because tricksters and jesters are the last 
best hope against the corporate music bu-
Copyright 1~)98, NCA 
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reaucracies that havp all blll killed the 
most interesting thing in popular IIlusic-
grassroots inspiration. vVe did it for laughs. 
We did it so vou could read this. -
-Negativland. "Negativland's First Press 
Release. November Ill, 1'l~II" (I!)'I:), p. ~.+) 
The Stars Down to Earth: 
Postmodemity, Authenticity 
and the 'Ground' of Judgment 
I T has become almost axiomatic in discussions of contemporary post 
(-structural, -Marxist) theory to be-
moan the inability of the academic 
political left to make judgments tied to 
affirmative social change. Dubbed the 
"crisis of authority" by Lawrence 
Grossberg (1992), the crisis is said to be 
a condition in which those who make 
"post" assumptions expend their ener-
gies refuting the Viability of any essen-
tial ground (personal or Archimidean) 
upon which to make judgments. The 
academic and political right, on the 
other hand, has no need for such persis-
tent self-reflection, and hence its views 
gain currency as it posits a stable space 
for authority in a fragmenting world. 
As Elspeth Probyn (199:1, p. 58) notes, 
"As the left continues to attack itself 
from within, a growing public dis-
course of 'new traditionalism' actively 
articulates care and community to the 
New Right. ... Transparent as it may 
seem ... the right's reclaiming 'funda-
mental' values constitutes an appealing 
platform. " 
One avenue into a discussion of the 
demise of "author-ity" would certainly 
be the theoretical and critical line that 
has traced ou t the links between 
changes in media and reproduction to 
transitions in authenticity and aura. 
From Walter Benjamin's (19:16/1968) 
concerns with the undermining of aura 
and authenticity in the age of mechani-
cal reproduction to Jean Baudrillard\ 
(1983) more recent celebration of simn 
lation and cultures of excess, "authen 
ticity" and the possibility of a politics 
of meaning have been intimatelv tied 
together. More recently, Grossberg has 
placed his focus on "authenticitv" 
within the fandom of (post)mod':rn 
rock culture. As he (1992, I 99:i) notes, 
the so-called "ideology of authentic 
ity" has provided the basis for aesthetic 
and political judgment in rock culture 
since its emergence in the 19!1Os.T'his 
ideology worked impliCitly and expiic 
itly to produce a tapas of alteritv and 
difference, a map of intersubjective and 
collective identity for postwar youth 
culture. The ideology of aUlhenticit\ 
has provided the ground for a practice 
of judgment through which musicians, 
fans and critics were able to distinguish 
between "authentic rock," which was 
transgressive and meaningful, and "in-
authentic rock" (or "pop"), which was 
co-opted and superficial. Inauthentic 
rock was mere commercial entertain-
ment; authentic rock was "something 
more-an excess by virtue of which 
rock can become a significant and pow-
erful investment" of pleasure and 
meaning in everyday life (1992, p. 2021. 
To paraphrase Grossberg, authentic 
rock made a difference in everyday life 
precisely because it enabled members 
of the rock community to evoke and 
conjure a place of difference hom main-
stream culture, a culture which made 
no difference to the alienation, terrof 
and boredom of postwar youth. 
Of course, the imaginary boundary 
dividing and distinguishing authentic 
and inauthentic has always been fluid 
and mobile; today's transgressive band, 
genre, style, label or subculture is tu-
morrow", co-opted "sell-out." Indeed, 
as Grossberg points out, this instability 
or specific definitions of authenticity 
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has been central to rock culture's vital-
ity as a source of meaningful difference 
in popular culture and everyday life: 
"[rock] must move from one center to 
another, transforming that which has 
been authentic into the inauthentic, in 
order to constantly project its claim to 
authenticity" (1992, p. 209). However, 
Grossberg and others (cf. Bloomfield, 
1993;Jones, 1993) argue this constant 
re-territorializing of the topos of authen-
ticity within rock culture has been prob-
lematized by the postrnodern medias-
cape within which the distinction 
between a surface of representational 
images and the "depth" of reality has 
collapsed. For Grossberg, the advent 
of postrnodernity spells the end of the 
ideology of authenticity as a resource 
for resistant judgments within rock cul-
ture, because differences between forms 
of rock as cultural practice are now 
understood and embraced as nothing 
more than differences in artifice, style 
and pose. 
Indeed, according to Grossberg, the 
dominant form of cultural practice and 
judgment within postmodernity is what 
he terms a "logic of authentic inauthen-
ticity." As Grossberg explains this logic, 
authentic in authenticity is 
indifferent to difference. It does not deny 
differences, it merely assumes that since 
there are no grounds for distinguishing 
between the relative claims of alternatives, 
one cannot read beyond the fact of invest-
ment. To appropriate, enjoy or invest in a 
particular style or set of images no longer 
necessarily implies any faith that such in-
vests will make a siguificant (even affec-
tive) difference .... If every identity is 
equally fake, a pose taken, then authentic 
inauthenticity celebrates the possibility of 
poses without denying that is all they 
are . ... Authentic inauthenticity, then, un-
dermines the very possibility of a privi-
leged marginality which can separate itself 
from and measure itself (favorably) against 
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an apparently homogenous mainstream. It 
marks the collapse, or at least the rel-
evance, of the difference between the au-
thentic and inauthentic. It siguals the ab-
sence of alternative spaces; we are all in 
the same space, co-opted (1992, pp. 225-
227). 
In other words, since in the postrnod-
ern we are always already co-opted, 
rock as a cultural practice can no longer 
be excessive or the site or scene of 
resistant judgment in any efficacious 
way apart from the transitory pleasures 
of the moment a pose is struck. Or, to 
use Grossberg's words, with the post-
modern collapse of authenticity, 
Rock can only produce an endless mobil-
ity, spaces without places, a paradoxical 
strategy by which people live an impos-
sible relation to their own lives. Rock will, 
by placing you within its own spaces, free 
you from the moment, but it will not prom-
ise any alternative spaces" (238). 
The question posed, then, and the 
one this paper investigates, is that of 
authenticity and judgment. If, as Gross-
berg claims, the lOgic of authenticity 
has given way to a logic of authentic 
inauthenticity, on what basis are judg-
ments made in everyday life, if they 
are at all? Has authenticity as a concept 
been evacuated or its meaning simply 
transformed? What is the impact of 
potential transformations? In order to 
investigate these questions, we offer a 
material study of a struggle over the 
concept of "authenticity" as it arose in 
the discourse surrounding the lawsuit 
that barred the release and manufac-
ture of "sound artists" Negativland's 
single, "The Letter 'u' and the Nu-
meral '2' ," 
One of our guiding methodological 
assumptions is that to understand "au-
thenticity" and judgments made on the 
basis of authenticity, especially resis-
tant judgments, one must turn away 
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from treatises about judgment and con-
struct a theory of authenticity out of its 
material use. In other words, one must 
create a materialist "conception of au· 
thenticity."i In Against Ethics,John Ca-
puto (1993) argues that in spite of our 
constant writing and rewriting of fhe 
obituary for judgment in contempo-
rary culture, "obligation happens" (6). 
As he provocatively suggests in the 
above epigram, the postmodern entails 
the loss of transcendent and absolute 
basis for judgment as fhe shining stars 
oflaw and satellites oflogos have disap-
peared from the heavens. Yet in spite 
of this "disaster," "obligation happens, 
the obligation of me to you and both of 
us to others. It is all around us, on 
every side, constantly tugb>ing at our 
sleeves, calling on us for a response" 
(1993, p. 6). And as obligation requires 
a sense of authenticity, so too does 
authenticity happen" It is this ubiquity 
of obligation, authenticity, and judg-
ment which constitutes the seams of 
the deontological materiality of every-
day life. 
Again, we will utilize the legal and 
public case that emerged as a result of 
the release of Negativland's single "The 
Letter U and the Numeral 2" as a 
location for the study of the materiality 
of authenticity. Rather than producing 
traditional "music" recordings, Nega-
tivland takes samples of various sounds 
from the media landscape and mixes 
fhem together along with their own 
voices and sounds to produce what 
could best be described as parodic col-
lages of various spectacles of contempo-
rary culture. In the case of the single 
that initiated the discussion which sur-
rounded tbis case, "The Letter 'li' and 
the Numeral '2'," Negativland pulled 
together samples of the U2 single "I 
Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking 
For," small quotations of interviews 
\1,\ !{( '11 1'1'1;-: 
with U2 band members. a vocal and 
sound parody of the U2 single, studio 
outtakes from Casey Kasem's "Ameri 
can Top 40" (many of them discussing 
U2), and various other sounds in order 
to comment on the popularity of U~ 
and the rock music industry in general. 
The recording was then released by 
SST records in a sleeve fhat promi-
nently featured the letters "U~" and a 
picture of the famous American spy 
plane of the same name. This artwork 
was blamed for leading some U2 fans 
to purchase the single when they incor· 
rectly assumed that it was a single by 
U2. Only weeks later, both Island Re 
cords and Warner-Chappell Music 
(U2's label and music publisher) filed 
suit against both N egativland and SST 
records demanding that SST stop pro 
ducing the single and that aU existing 
copies of the recording be turned over 
to Island. When the case was settled, 
SST and Negativland were compelled 
to pay more than $90,O()O in legal fees 
and damages and attempt to remove 
all copies of the single from circulatIon. 
Since Island/Warner Chappell first 
filed suit in November 1991, the case 
has acquired a good deal of notoriety 
as an interesting example of copyright 
and trademark infringement 111 the age 
of sampling and digital reproduction.! 
Most useful to our interests 1 however, 
is the fact that the case generated a 
great deal of discourse by fans and 
litigants. With access to the World 
Wide v,r eb, a virtual communitv \vas 
created around the case that allowed 
for the distribution of numerous legal 
documents, the single itself, and numer-
ous spaces for fan discussions of the 
case and) consequently, of I-he notion 
of authenticity. 
We utilize the case of the Negaliv, 
land single and the lawsuit and conver-
sations that it spurred to investigate a 
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material discussion of authenticity and 
judgment. Ultimately, we will argue 
that the case illustrates the construc-
tion and deployment of a transformed 
notion of authenticity fitting the needs 
of a postrnodem epistemology. While 
Negativland initially attempted to de-
fend itself using the logic of romantic 
authenticity (the artist as free-standing 
author of his/her own ideas, created 
solely by him or her), this logic was 
certain to fail as it could-and was-
effectively deployed against the band's 
own practices, given that their perfor-
mances are reassemblages of frag-
mented discourses. Hence, Negativ-
land's ultimate defense came through a 
construction of a lOgic of authenticity 
as free appropriation. "Authenticity" 
continued to function as a key term 
(albeit transformed) despite Grossberg's 
(and others') obituary of the concept. 
We will begin below by engaging in 
a close reading of the documents per-
taining to the N egativland case in or-
der to illustrate the employment of the 
Romantic notion of authenticity. Sec-
ond, after reviewing the failure of their 
use of the Romantic notion, we will 
focus on the construction of an authen-
ticity offree appropriation and the im-
plications this logic calls for that differ 
from those of Grossberg's authentic 
inauthenticity. Finally, we end with a 
discussion of how these different logics 
can function in contemporary culture. 
Even Better than Real Thing: 
The Acrobatics of 
Authenticity and 
Appropriation 
Bono: (reading from magazine ad) "When 
was the last time you saw anything so 
authentic look so good." Look at the state 
of white rock n' roll: It's never been so 
retrogressive. What is described as "alter-
native" is no more than raw bass, drums 
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and guitar-that mix again. And these ritu-
als, like smashing instruments on stage, 
they ring so hollow now, they feel so dated. 
That's why I stopped thinking of U2 as a 
rock band because what that's become I 
can no longer relate to. We feel more 
affinity with hip-hop groups; they're seiz-
ing the technology and bending it to their 
own use. That's one of things we are most 
excited about Zoo TV: Music is mutating 
into audio-visual forms, and as the ground 
gives way underneath us we're excited, we 
want to go sliding, sliding down the surface 
of things. 
William Gibson [author of Neuromancer]: 
So, do you have any favorite contradic-
tions? 
Bono: Art and commerce.... (Gibson, 
1994, p. (6) 
Artists have always approached the entire 
world around them as both an inspiration 
to act and as raw material to mold and 
remold. Other art is just more raw material 
to us and to many, many others we could 
point to. When it comes to cultural influ-
ences, ownership is the point of fools .... 
We claim the right to create with mirrors. 
This is our working philosophy. (Negativ-
land, 1995, p. 23). 
As we have noted, the ideology of 
authenticity, and its concomitant no-
tion of authorship, has long been a 
vexed issue within popular music stud-
ies as well as within rock culture itself. 
As Bloomfield (1993) and Jones (1993) 
have explored in some detail, this ide-
ology has its origins in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Romanticism along 
with the emergence of the modem, 
bourgeois form of the song.3 Accord-
ing to Bloomfield (1993, p. 17), the 
Romantic ideology of authenticity con-
sists of several elements which serve to 
construct a profound intersubjective 
communion between author and audi-
ence. First, it foregrounds the creativity 
of the artist in terms of being able to 
powerfully and sincerely articulate and 
P( )IJTf(:S ()F A! THE~TT('ITl 
evoke the inner subjective experience 
of the individual; second, this experi· 
ence is put into the form of the song, 
which, third, is disseminated through 
performance, and, fourth, resonates 
with and enhances the emotional expe-
rience of the listener. Thus, the Roman-
tic ideology of authenticity entails an 
affective and symbolic economy of pro 
duction, consumption, and exchange 
within which artist and audience are 
sutured in an imaginary locus of com-
mon identitv. 
Of cours~, as Atalli (1985) has ar 
gued, this ideology effaces two central 
social facts that have shaped the devel-
opment of popular music since the Ro-
mantic era: the displacement of live 
performance by audio recording and 
the commodification of music by the 
capitalist culture industry. As Jones 
(1993) argues, in the age of audio repro-
duction, authenticity is not grounded 
in what one writes or performs, but 
how one sounds. Moreover, the pro-
cess of producing, recording, and dis-
tributing sounds is highly complex and 
institutionalized, thus further displac-
ing the Romantic author as the origin 
and creator of musical experience. Fi-
nally, with the development of a music 
industry and its constituent legal dis-
courses of copyright and trademark, 
not only have proprietary rights of own-
ership over creative work been trans· 
ferred from the artist to record and 
publishing companies, but the very im-
age itself of the artist as authentic au-
thor becomes the property of the indus-
try. 
Yet in spite of these contradictions, 
the ideology of authenticity and Ro-
mantic notions of authorship has re-
mained fairly hegemonic within rock 
culture. Not only do fans invoke their 
understandings of authenticity as a dis-
criminating axis of judgment, but so 
too, to use .lones's words, does the 
"popular music industry clings "bstJ-
nately to the author" (199,1, p. SO:.' [n 
the Negativland/U2 case, these contra 
dictions exploded, and in this explo-
sion, a gap was found between the 
romantic uotion of authenticity and 
the works produced via new media 
technologies. Perhaps what is most fas-
cinating about the case is that it demon-
strates that there is not a single, unitary 
ideology of authenticity operative III 
rock culture. Rather, there is a hetero-
geneous ideology with multiple mean-
ings and contradictory connotations "f 
"authenticity," with dominant and 
transgressive articulations, which en-
tail different material and symbolic 
economies of musical producti~m, con-
sumption and exchange. What we see 
in the case is, so to speak, an acrobatics 
of authenticity as the parties rhetOli-
cally deploy and combine different no· 
tions of authenticity in order to con-
struct a ground of judgment upon 
which to stand and act. Below, then, 
we will examine the dominant le!!;al 
discourse of authenticity as embodied 
in the initial suit filed by Island Re 
cords and Warner/Chappell Music 
against SST records and Negativland, 
showing here the way that authenticity 
is constructed in as an element of the 
commodity. Second, we will illustrate 
the way in which a Romantic notion of 
ideology is rehearsed and then re 
jected by Negativland as its arguments 
are shown to work as easily against as 
in support of, their case. Next, we will 
investigate Negativland's articulation of 
a logic of authentic appropriation. 
Rather than rejecting authenticity ft)r 
an authentic inauthenticity, the legal 
case, because it centers on notions of 
ownership, forces the nlaintenance of 
some sense of artistic ownership and 
authenticity. The lo,~c that emerges is 
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one fitting the postmodern medias-
cape, holding implications for the log-
ics of postmodernity. 
Desire, Anxiety, and 
"Goodwill": The Authenticity 
of the Commodity 
When N egativland recorded The Let-
ter U and the Numeral 2, they had every 
intention of subverting the symbolic 
economy of authenticity so dear to 
mainstream pop music culture."' The 
titular and substantive subject of their 
parody was a band whose commercial 
and popular image signified artistic in-
tegrity, emotional passion, and politi-
cal commitment. Indeed, it was this 
reputed authenticity of the band which 
was highlighted in Island Records' pro-
motional campaign for the album, The 
Joshua Tree, in which U2 was given the 
moniker "The Conscience of Rock and 
Roll." Moreover, their very choice of a 
U2 song to satirize and deconstruct 
was an indicator of their subversive 
designs. Not only was "I Still Haven't 
Found What I'm Looking For" U2's 
first American Top 40 hit, it was also 
an archetypal example of the invoca-
tion of the ineffable ground of soulful 
rock and roll sincerity and authentic-
ity, the gospel-blues song.6 Finally, as 
they were to later admit, their choice of 
cover design (a large "U2" superim-
posed over an image of the U2 spy 
plane) was meant disrupt the connota-
tion of the band's name as a signifier of 
authenticity. When considered as a 
whole, Negativland was to argue that 
"Our U2 was a spy plane full of secrets 
intruding into the self-righteous and 
complacent image-world of the polite 
pop of the stars. We did it as an ex-
ample of something not being what it 
seems to be" (Negativland, 1995, p. 
25). Yet what the band did not nnder-
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stand at the time was how inextricably 
linked the dominant affective and sym-
bolic economies of authenticity are with 
production and circulation of cultural 
commodities. In other words, N egativ-
land was seemingly naive to the fact 
that, to the culture industry, authentic-
ity is more than simply affect and mean-
ing; it is a form of private property. 
It is of course the function of trade-
mark and copyright law to discursively 
construct and institutionally enforce 
particular notions of authenticity as 
property right. As Jones insightfully 
points out, this function is grounded in 
the very etymological roots of the word 
"property" : 
Derived the Latin proprius, meaning "one's 
own," the word property was a doublet of 
propriety in More's Utopia. In current us-
age the former is used make reference to 
ownership, the latter refers to a standard of 
behavior, and Copyright law intertwines 
the two, harkening back to the Latin pro-
prius and its derivative proprietas, meaning 
proper signification with words. What is 
negotiated when one enters into a licens-
ing agreement based on copyright is, in 
essence, proper signification, as deter-
mined by the copyright holder (1992, p. 
118) 
As Gaines (1991) and Coombe (1993) 
explore in some detail, what is true of 
copyright law in this regard is also true 
of trademark law. Both operate so as to 
construct a proprietary right of the 
owner of a cultural commodity's copy-
right and trademark over its potential 
meaning and interpretation. Proper sig-
nification of the symbolic value of the 
commodity, in turn, forms the basis for 
what the legal discourse of copyright 
and trademark term the "entitlement" 
of the owner to fully "exploit" the 
exchange value of the commodity in 
the market place by ensuring its proper 
use (Gaines, 1991, p. 39). For the 
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economy of commodity production 
and consumption to "work" (i.e., to 
produce a profit for the owner), the 
symbolic economy of affect and ideol 
ogy must be legally structured so as to 
constrain the surplus meaning of pot en-
tial polysemy and prevent the corrup-
tion of the signification value of the 
product. Any unauthorized appropria-
tion and alternative signification must 
be strictly controlled, if not prohibited 
(Coombe, 1993, p. 415). Thus, in Bata-
ilJean terms, the discourse of copyright 
and trademark law constitutes a re-
stricted economy of signification (d. Plot-
niksky, 1993). 
It was precisely this restricted 
economy of signification, with its privi 
leged meanings of authenticity, into 
which Negativland's "U2 spy plane 
full of secrets" intruded and brought 
forth the wrath of the real owners of 
U2's sound and image, Island Records 
and Warner-Chappell Music. Less than 
three weeks after the single was re-
leased, the two companies filed suit for 
copyright and trademark infringement 
against SST Records and Negativland. 
The brief itself makes for fascinating 
reading as it illustrates not only the 
discursive construction of property 
right over the authenticity of cultural 
commodity in terms of semiotic integ-
rity, but also the construction of con-
sumer desire within the restricted sym-
bolic economv of the cultural 
commodity. ' 
The suit be,,'ins with an invocation of 
the ineffable gTound of property right 
over the cultural commodity in legal 
discourse, the proprietary entitlement 
to exploit U2 as sound and image. The 
plaintiffs, the suit claims, 
have the exclusive rights to throughout the 
world to manufacture, distribute aod sell 
(either directly or though authorized licens-
ees) sound recordings embodying the per-
formances by the renowned musical group 
known as '''U:2,'' and ... have the exdusivt~ 
rights to publish and administer the copy-
rights in U2's musical compositions. Plail1-
tiff~ are exclusively entitled to the use Lite 
band's wel1-know~ name and mark "l.]/" 
in connection with the explOitation of these 
rights (found in Negativland, 1'l'l5, p .. ",). 
The suit argues that the N egativland 
single, both the form of its packaging 
and its content, represents an infi'inge-
men! of the plaintiffs' entitlement to 
exploit the sound and image of U:Z 
under prevailing trademark and copy-
right law. Moreover, because the Nega-
tivland single had been put into circula-
tion just in advance of the "widely 
anticipated new album by U:Z" (Ach.-
tung Baby), it was "nothing less than a 
consumer fraud, and a blatantly unlaw-
ful attempt to usurp the anticipated 
profits and goodwill to which the plain 
tiffs are entitled from the exploitation 
of recordings and musical composi-
tions by U:Z" (f<lUnd in Negativland, 
1995, p. 6). Note here that a new term, 
"goodwill," is introduced into the rhe-
torical logic of the restricted economy 
of the cultural commodity. It is around 
the concept/metonym of "goodwill" 
that the hrief constructs a historical 
narrative within which the plaintiffs, 
the band, and consumers are sutured 
together in a realm of corporate sover-
eignty. 
I n strict legal terms, according to 
Gaines (1991), "goodwill" is the "guar-
antee that the buyer could expect, frOill 
the source behind the goods, the same 
values and qualities received with the 
last purchase" (p. 211). Rhetorically, 
however, "goodwill" operates as a 
metonym that resents a complex rela-
tionship between the authentic sym-
bolic value of the cultural commodity, 
the desires of the consuming audience, 
and the corporation as the g-uardian 
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and trustee of both. "Goodwill," as it 
were, operates as the coin of the realm 
of corporate sovereignty over the re-
stricted symbolic economy of the cul-
tural commodity. 
The better part of the brief is de-
voted to a historical narrative chroni-
cling the successful commercial career 
of U2, the longstanding relationship of 
ownership of the plaintiffs of the band's 
name, sound, and image, and the con-
comitant entitlement of the former to 
exploit the latter. This history of the 
band's commercial relationship with 
Island and Warner-Chapell focnses es-
pecially on the "enormous artistic and 
commercial success" of TheJoshua Tree 
and the Grammy Award-winning sta-
tus of the hit single form the album, "I 
Still Haven't Found What I'm Looking 
For." This history of the proprietary 
right of the plaintiffs over the success of 
the band in the past sets the stage for 
the claims in the present and the fu-
ture, which center on the "goodwill" 
and desire of the consumer. Island Re-
cords, the suit explained, was about to 
release the new U2 record (Achtung 
Baby) and "given U2's enormous popu-
larity, it is inescapable that U2's fans 
are anxiously awaiting the day when 
they will find U2's new album in re-
cord stores" (found in Negativland, 
199.5, p. 1O-·U). 
It was into the situation of enhanced 
consumer anxiety and desire for U2, a 
situation which only Island Records 
was entitled to exploit, that N egativ-
land and SST Records improperly en-
tered. On the basis of trademark and 
copyright infringement, the N egativ-
land single would have deceived U2 
fans into thinking it is the "real thing," 
frustrated their desire and corrupt their 
goodwill, and therefore usurped the 
plaintitrs entitlement to their profits. 
According to the suit, the single repre-
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sented an "egregious" consumer fraud 
in both form and content. It's packag-
ing and labeling would lead "unwitting 
consumers" into being "duped into pur-
chasing that record in the mistaken 
belief that it is the new U2 record" 
(found in Negativland, 199.5, p. 11). 
Even more "outrageous" than this 
trademark violation, the suit contended, 
was the content of the single itself. 
Interestingly, the weight of the briefs 
claims to copyright infringement rested 
not so much upon unauthorized sam-
pling of the original song, but upon the 
satirizing context into which the sam-
ple was placed. In this regard, the suit 
is worth quoting in detail: 
[The single] is replete with expletives, 
curses, and scatolOgical language which 
many consumers will likely find offensive, 
and which undoubtedly anger and upset 
parents of youngsters who purchase the 
"U2 Negativland" record. It must be em-
phasized that U2 has cultivated a clean cut 
image, and its recordings never include 
such language ... The band's image will be 
tarnished, and the name and mark "U2" 
and the goodwill associated with it will be 
substantially harmed as a result of the de-
fendant's deception which will lead con-
sumers to purchase what they believe to be 
a U2 album, only to find a recording con-
taining such lyrics ... [and] will lead them 
to conclude and that U2 has made a poor 
quality and offensive recording, thus fur-
ther unlawfully tarnishing the band's repu-
tation and image, and the enormously valu-
able "U2" name and mark. This would 
undoubtedly diminish future sales of U2 
recordings, to the detriment of both U2 
and Island Records (found in Negativland, 
1995, p. 15). 
It is important to emphasize that the 
last sentence of the passage was the 
only place in the entire brief where the 
band was described as a party that 
would be injured by the alleged trade-
mark and copyright infringements. Any 
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financial damage that the band might 
suffer as a result of the Negativland 
single existing in the world was com-
pletely subordinate to the "irreparable 
harm" that would be done to Island 
Records and Warner Chappell's entitle-
ment to exploit their product. Indeed, 
within the legal discourse of copyright 
and trademark, U:2 exists primarily as 
a "name" and a "mark" that signifies a 
particular "authentic" U:2 sound which 
is owned by the record and publishing 
company. 7 Accordingly, as the passage 
makes exquisitely clear, the most "egre-
gious" violation of the single was its 
transgression of the restricted symbolic 
economy of authenticity: it looks like 
U2, but in a subversion of that band's 
Singular aural identity, sounds like a 
cacophonous riot of profane poly-
semy. On the basis of this sonic subver-
sion and surplus of meaning, the brief 
conjures a scenario of semiotic seduc-
tion, consumer betrayal and commer-
cial disaster: "Unwitting" consumers, 
seeking satisfaction of their desires in 
the "real thing," would be deceived by 
the form of the single, only to be of 
fended by its content. Tbrown into a 
chaos of sonic inauthenticity, they 
would find the integrity of the commod-
ity to be corrupted and abandon it, 
taking their goodwill and money with 
them. Therefore, the brief argues, the 
very existence of the single repre-
sented a mortal threat to the potential 
success of the new U2 release or, as the 
narrative of the brief concludes with 
metaphorical flourish, "Once the 
'horses' are out of the 'barn door,' the 
harm to Island Records will be done 
and irreparable" (found in Negativ-
land, 1995, p. Hi). 
The telos of the briefs argument, the 
"requested relief' for copyright and 
trademark infringement, is logically in-
exorable and ideologically inescap-
able: to preserve the integrity and all-
thenticity of the commodity, to 
preserve the "goodwiHH of consurIlcrs, 
and to maintain corporate sovereignty 
over both, all forms and traces of this 
transgression must be expunged hom 
existence so that it is never heard again. 
On November:i, 1991, based upon an 
out-of-court settlement between Island/ 
Warner-Chappell and Negativlandi 
SST, the U.S. District Court of Central 
California decreed that this relief 
would, in fact, be the dominant legal 
judgment. Negativland and SST were 
probibited from further productlOn and 
distribntion of the signal and were re 
quired to retrieve and destroy of all 
copies of tbe single, its artwork, adver 
tising, master recordings and dupli-
cates. In addition, the ownership of the 
copyrigbt of the single was assigned to 
Island/Warner-Chappell forever. 
Postivland: The Failure of 
Romantic Authenticity and 
the Tum to Free 
Appropriation 
How was a resistant judgment, acro-
batically balanced npon the unstable 
gTound of postmodern authenticity, cre-
ated in this case? To answer this ques-
tion, another one must be posed: is it 
possible to 'account' for snrplus mean-
ing, meaning that exceeds or trans-
gresses the boundaries of copyrighted 
authorial intent, in the symbolic 
economy of cultural production? The 
very question represents a conundrum 
for the legal discourse of copyright and 
trademark and its notion of the authen-
ticity of the commodity. As we have 
seen in the preceding section, in order 
for the owner of the cultural commod-
ity to keep an account of the symbolic 
and excbange value of the commodity, 
there can be no surplus of meaning. 
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Such polysemie surplus is excessive of 
its restricted economy, and corrosive 
of the commodity's authenticity as 
sound and image. It therefore cannot 
be accounted for. And what is exces-
sive of its system of accounting must be 
either disciplined (that is, brought 
within it in the form of payments for 
use of the copyright or trademark), or 
banished from the cultural field alto-
gether. 
In contrast, as we shall see, the resis-
tant judgment developed in this case, 
both by Negativland and its fan base 
(as witnessed in arguments on "alt.mu-
sic.alternative" and on the Negativ-
land homepage), refuses the necessity 
and desire for accounting for symbolic 
value altogether. Rather, it entails a 
principle of excessive semiotic extrava-
gance which subverts the very idea 
and practice of an accounting of sur-
plus meaning. The heterological no-
tion of postmodern authenticity devel-
oped by N egativland and its fan 
community, which is based upon a 
strategic and tactical practice of cul-
tural appropriation, embraces and cel-
ebrates a playful symbolic economy of 
heterogeneity which renders meaning-
less an accounting for meaning. 
William Corlett describes this sym-
bolic economy without restrictions: "In 
a politics of extravagance, all lives hinge 
upon how silence is broken and main-
tained. To live extravagantly is to give 
gifts freely, to cultivate one's gifts in all 
directions. The word extravagance sig-
nifies the madness of losing oneself in 
the practice of everyday life" (1989, p. 
211). Accordingly, in distinct contrast 
to the restricted economy of copyright 
and trademark law where the point is 
to preserve sovereignty over meaning 
as the entitlement to exploit, in the 
excessive economy of extravagance the 
point is to dissolve sovereignty in the 
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process of open-ended appropriation 
and gift-giving. From the perspective 
of dominant law, as Corlett points out, 
such extravagance is akin to madness 
as it entails the displacement of the 
identity and meaning of the cultural 
commodity. To return to Caputo's 
metaphor with whieh we opened this 
paper, the politics of extravagance rep-
resents a disaster for the unitary logos of 
dominant law. However, from the per-
spective of resistance, the disaster of 
heterological extravagance entails a po-
tentially endless profusion of mean-
ings, pleasures and identities and repre-
sents the exuberance of cultural 
creativity, which is deemed as being 
the very ground of a distinctively post-
modern authenticity itself. At the end 
of the N egativland case is a new rhetori-
cal territory of cultural production and 
circulation, a territory that might ex-
travagantly be called "Positivland." 
Before we proceed to an exploration 
of how this politics of extravagance 
emerged, it is important to offer two 
caveats about what may be deemed an 
insufficiency of our analysis in this sec-
tion. First, we offer a thematic analysis 
of the development of this judgment 
rather than a comprehensive history of 
the events in which this judgment was 
situated. As such, we unfortunately 
gloss over or ignore altogether what 
are interesting as well as entertaining 
details about the twist and turns the 
case took. 8 Second, in our analysis here, 
we focus exclUSively on statements and 
texts produced by N egativland itself 
rather than the fan base at large. Even 
so, we believe (as Negativland said 
itself) that these texts are representa-
tive of a like-minded community as 
they are products of an extensive and 
expansive dialogue between Negativ-
land and that community. 
The argument over authenticity, and 
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the struggle with the Romantic notion, 
was not one that came fully articulated 
by Negativland. Instead, in the "publi-
cation n of various statements and com-
muniques by the band (some in re-
sponse to fans, some in response to 
legal ongoings), various notions of au-
thenticity were bantered about, coher-
ing into more specific ones. The entire 
struggle took place, however. on the 
grounds of challenging the legal judg-
ment that had been articulated under/ 
with the concept of "Fair Use." Fair 
use, of course, is a provision of the 
United States Copyright Act of 1976 
§ 107 that allows for the re-use of copy-
righted material without prior consent 
of the owner and without payment of 
fees under any circumstances!) When 
the case began, Negativland argued for 
a liberal interpretation of the Fair Use 
provision on grounds very similar to 
those later given voice to by Justice 
David Souter in the Supreme Court's 
decision in the Campbell v. AcujJ-Rose 
Music, Inc. [1994 WL 647:,H (U.S. Mar. 
7, 1994)1. also known as the '2 Live 
Crew/Pretty Woman case. 10 However, 
very much in the sense of Lyotard's 
(19RR) distinction between litigation 
and the differend, even an attempt to 
argue for a more liberal reading of Fair 
Use ultimately worked to reify domi-
nant law by binding cultural practice 
to the terms of the law. While we do 
not wish to argue that existing legal 
definitions of copyright and fair use 
were immaterial to the case (or of no-
tions of authenticity), especially in cases 
of sampling and electronic means of 
aural re/production (c.f. Sanjek, 19~J4), 
we are more interested here in the 
ways in which Negativland's more ex-
pansive use of the term "Fair Use" 
acted in excess of existing legal mean-
mgs. 
Fairly early on after first losing the 
rights to keep their recording on Ihc 
market. Negativland released a press 
statement asking for a discussion about 
the varions possible ways in which ar-
tistic integrity and legal rights could be 
configured. As the band noted, given 
the disparity in economic and legal 
power between themselves and Island 
Records, and given that it had already 
had been forced to "agree completely" 
to Island's demands, a iClI"llm in which 
it was able to articulate its understand-
ing of fair use was needed (Negativ-
land, 1995, p. :2:2). Criticizing the legal 
decision and Island's demands as ones 
that linked together the marketplace 
and the legal decision in opposition to 
artistic integrity, it noted, "Apparentlv, 
Island's sole concern in this act of cen-
sorship is their determination to con-
trol the marketplace. as if the only 
reason to Inake records is to make 
monev ... [n this culture. the market 
rules ~nd money is power. They own 
the law, and no one who is still inter·· 
ested in the supremacy of a vital and 
freewheeling art can afford not chal-
lenge this aspect of our decline" (Nega-
tivland, 1995, p. '22). Negativland later 
re-articulated this critique of music as 
commodity in its "Tenets of Free Ap-
propriation": "No one should be al~ 
lowed to claim a private control over 
the creative process itself. This struggle 
is essentially one of art against busi ~ 
ness. and ultimately about which one 
must make way for the other" INegativ-
land, 1995, p. 251). 
Up until this point, the argument 
that Negativland made worked well 
within the tradilional rock culture dif-
ferentiation between the "inauthentic 
mainstream"-positing music as COlll-
modity-and the authentic artistic mar-
gins of art for its own sake. The prob-
lem was that this Romantic notion of 
authentic artistry worked as a point of 
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contention between Negativland and 
SST Records owner Greg Ginn. The 
story of their conflict helps explain in 
part their eventual construction of a 
different meaning of "authenticity." 
In Ginn's argument with Negativ-
land (it refused to split the costs of the 
legal case with him on a 50-50 basis), 
Ginn in effect publicly charged Nega-
tivland with not fitting the traditional 
notion of "artists." Ginn accused N ega-
tivland of inauthenticity in that they 
were not a "real band" as evidenced 
by the fact that "they have never toured 
and have only played occasional live 
shows" (N egativland 1995, p. 51). In 
contrast to authentic expressions of 
punk, Negativland was simply an "up-
per middle class hobby," "victims of a 
media cocoon they frequently lam-
poon" (Negativland, 1995, p. 52). Ironi-
cally enough, then, when N egativland 
relied on the Romantic notion of "au-
thenticity," they were leaving them-
selves open for charges of "inauthentic-
ity" and hence of infringement. By 
using the traditional terms of litigation, 
they fell within dominant judgment. If 
their "art" was not an originary cre-
ative act, they could not own it accord-
ing to existing law. 
Hence, when the Romantic notion 
of authenticity was not a fitting re-
sponse to its own work, Negativland 
found itself faced with a case in which 
their understanding of their practice 
worked outside of existing notions of 
creativity and ownership. In effect, 
Negativland offered an interpretation 
of its act that worked as a differend to 
existing legal judgments. Negativland 
argued for an authenticity "of copy-
right infringement and sampling as a 
legitimate creative technique" (Negativ-
land 1995, p. 48). As it was later to call 
it, this was an authenticity of "free 
appropriation" rather than "fair use." 
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Building this logic of free appropria-
tion involved rethinking the history of 
art and reinvestigating present situa-
tions for artistic production. Negativ-
land directly attacked the Romantic 
notion of authorship as the sole crite-
rion of authenticity by arguing that 
"the law must educate itself to the fact 
that ever since monkey's saw or did, 
the entire history of art forms has been 
BASED ON THEFT" (Negativland, 
1995: 23). In one of the documents 
about the case most widely circulated 
on the Web, "Crosley Bendix Dis-
cusses the Copyright Act," Negativ-
land expanded this argument by dis-
cussing the development of different 
forms of art: folk music, blues, jazz, 
Dada, Surrealism and Pop Art have all 
had "creative theft as their modus oper-
andi" (Negativland, n.d., p. 3). Going 
further, Negativland suggested that the 
proliferation of examples of such theft 
"all but forms a tradition of 'natural 
law' " (Negativland, n.d., p. 3). Hence, 
by making the idea of free appropria-
tion appear as "natural law," the band 
coactively took what would be a dis-
junctive definition of fair use (a differ-
end) and posited it as the "correct" 
definition. 
After advancing this notion of cre-
ative theft as a historical practice, Nega-
tivland suggested that the artistic pro-
cess should be seen as an "obvious and 
natural desire to embody or transform 
existing things as a form of dialog with 
the material environment" (Negativ-
land 1995, p. 150). Hence, rather than 
positing originality as inhering in the 
singular vision of the individual artist, 
it inheres in the process of transforma-
tion that occurs within the context of 
the shared culture of a community. 
The authenticity of appropriation, how-
ever it is manifested, is decentered and 
dialogical. Far from being an act of 
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piracy or plagiarism, appropriation is a 
gesture of respect and inspiration, 
where one uses an original source as a 
springboard for one's own creativity, 
thus adding to the cultural conversa-
tion,tl 
Negativland also linked this new no-
tion of authenticity and appropriation 
to the postmodern landscape. As ar-
gued in "Fair Use" in almost Baudrillar-
dian fashion, the dominant sphere of 
everyday life has become reflective of 
the contemporary media landscape. 
Therefore, everything that circulates in 
the mediascape should be understood 
as always already suitable for appro-
priation because it is already in the 
public domain. While existing copy-
right laws demand that one recognize 
"the exclusive interests of private own-
ers," the proliferation of new media 
technologies and electronic reproduc-
tion demands that people move from 
being passive spectators to active par-
ticipants in cultural production (Nega-
tivland, 1995, p. 190). In other words, 
it is the law as written that is lagging 
behind in the changing epistemology 
brought on by the changing medias-
cape. 
Conclusions: Free 
Appropriation and Hypertext 
Consciousness 
What is most important about the 
N egativland case is that as a starting 
point for a theoretical discussion of 
postmodern notions of judgment and 
authenticity, it is the basis of specula-
tion for senses of ownership and au-
thenticity as culture and logics con-
tinue to change through new media 
technologies. In recent media and hy-
pertext theory (here, seeing the Inter-
net as the example par excellence of 
hypertext), George Landow (1992) ar-
gues that the logic of hypertext (i.e .. 
links made hv interest rather than b, 
rational hier~rchy) will become the 
dominant logic of contemporary (post 
)modern culture. Such a claim be· 
comes interesting to this case when 
traced through media theory and claims 
concerning the ownership of ideas. We 
do not mean to collapse the entire case 
of Negativland and its arguments into 
one determined by changes in media. 
What we are suggesting is that changes 
in media form and the accompanying 
changes in logics have led to an emerg-
ing consciousness in which Negativ-
land could "reasonably" posit their 
rather postmodern tactical practice and 
articulate their sense of "free appropria-
tion." 
If, as Walter Ong (19!l2) argues, ideas 
of copyright and ownership come from 
the logics tied to literacy and print, 
their transformation comes witb the 
dominance of electronic media, espe-
cially hypertextual forms of conscious-
ness. It is important to note here that 
the logic of any given change in media 
technology always contains elements 
and residue of the consciousness that 
preceded it. For example, the logic of 
literacy necessarily contains and is in-
fluenced by the influence of oral con-
sciousness. Similarly, electronic media 
and hypertext do not lead to an era-
sure of such concepts as anthenticity 
and ownership so much as their trans-
formation. Stuart Moulthrop (1994), 
relying on Deleuze and Gualtari's dis-
cussion of striated vs. smooth episte-
mologies (i.e., routine, speCification, 
sequence and causality vs. transforma-
tion, consensus, holism, random con--
nections), provides an argument that 
links to the arguments over authentic 
ity that occur in this case. While many 
~ho study bypertext have argued that 
the new media technologies provide 
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an almost utopian space for smooth 
thinking and smooth subjectivity, 
Moulthrop suggests that the transition 
is never complete and therefore never 
a fully smooth space (1994, p. 316). On 
this point, he quotes Deleuze and Guat-
tari (1987) in noting that smooth and 
striated space "exist only in mixtnre: 
smooth space is constantly being trans-
lated, transversed into a striated space; 
striated space is constantly being re-
versed, retnrned to a smooth space" (p. 
474). So while notions ofromantic au-
thenticity may crumble, especially 
when it comes to the pastiche-like cre-
ations of Negativland, they give way 
not to a sense of authentic inauthentic-
ity but instead to a different, perhaps 
more fitting, notion of authenticity-the 
authenticity of free appropriation. 
Moulthrop's comments about the 
mixing of smooth and striated space 
certainly find resonance when we com-
pare electronic hypertext with pastiche-
like recordings. That is, because hyper-
text is an unstable "practice" while 
N egativland's recordings become 
somewhat "stabilized" in the very act 
of putting sounds on tape, the record-
ings act as much clearer examples of 
the mix of smoothness and striation. 
While the resources of hypertext (such 
as the World Wide Web) may be con-
stant (even this is not true as their 
creation and transformation currently 
occur at a rapid pace), the potential 
combination of links is limitless and 
hence, the manifestation of hypertext 
in nse is perpetnally unstable. On the 
other hand, with something more 
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stable, such as Negativland's record-
ing, the potentiality of linked frag-
ments has been limited; the potential 
links of sounds stabilized into one par-
ticnlar configuration that remains the 
same through each listen. If this were 
hypertext, it wonld be the same as 
following someone else's links in the 
same way repeatedly, the link order 
and content never changing. Hence, 
because the links are solidified, Nega-
tivland has grounds to argue for an 
"authentic" and original "product," 
something impossible in a purely 
smooth scenario. However, because 
their "hypertextual" recording uses 
sounds "owned" by others, Negativ-
land and its recordings are in a seem-
ingy ambiguous space between 
smoothness and striation, between "au-
thenticity" and "inauthenticity." The 
ambiguity is somewhat solved because 
the lOgic of capitalism requires the no-
tion of ownership, and hence, N egativ-
land, and others, are forced to con-
struct a notion of authenticity and 
ownership despite the theoretical argu-
ments that authenticity and originality 
are no longer working concepts. In the 
Negativland case, we are provided with 
a glimpse into not only cultural 
struggles as they are enacted in the 
arguments over authenticity, but also 
the ways that changes in media, in 
conjunction with economic demands 
and the weight of past discourses on 
the present, are leading us to changing 
notions of authenticity and original-
ity. 0 
Notes 
lThe notion of a "materialist conception of judgment" is a paraphrase of Michael McGee's 
(1982) "A Materialist's Conception of Rhetoric." In that essay, McGee, certainly influenced by 
Gramsci, took those who studied rhetoric to task for attempting to understand its meaning outside 
of the context of "rhetoric" in practice, in the material conditions of everyday life. 
1(; 
POLITICS OF AUTHENTICITY MARCH 1998 
2The case has been widely written about in the music press, as well as discussed in articles in law 
and other academic journals. Indeed, the notoriety of the case has been in no small measure due to 
aggressive guerrilla publicity campaign waged by Negativland on the Internet and other alterna-
tive media. The members of Negativland themselves have collected nearly all oftexts produced by 
and about the case in Fair Use: The Story of the Letter U and the Numeral 2 (1995). 
3By Romanticism we are referring to the aesthetic movement, encompassing literature, the 
visual arts and music, which emerged in the late eighteenth century and flourished until the 
mid-nineteenth century. The principal features of Romanticism were a rejection of the Enlighten-
ment valorization of reason and its embodiment in the emergence of modern industrial "civiliza-
tion," and a concomitant celebration of nature, emotion, instinct and passion as the fount of 
uncorrupted human spirituality and individual creativity. According to J aszi, Romanticism is 
characterized by radical subjectivism which entailed "an extreme assertion of the self and the value 
of individual experience" in the face of an increasingly complex and alienating world of emergent 
industrial capitalism (1991, p. 455). However, we are less concerned with features of Romanticism 
per se than with its notions of creative authorship and authenticity which have become institution-
alized in copyright law as the juridical constitution of what Bettig (1993, p. 149) calls the "creative 
subject." Inspired by Foucault's (1984) analysis of the "author function" in the discursive formation 
of the modern artistic subject, scholars such as Saunders (1992),Jaszi (1991, 1994), Rose (1988), 
and Woodmansee (1984, 1994) have engaged in a genealogy of the juridical constitution of what 
Jaszi terms (1994, p. 33) the '''author-genius'' and its ideological roots in the Romantic movement. 
AsJaszi and Woodmansee succinctly summarize the Romantic ideology of authorship, "genuine 
authorship is originary is the sense that it results not in a variation, an in imitation, or an adaptation 
... but in an utterly unique-in a word, "'original"-work which, accordingly, may be said to be the 
property of the creator and to merit the law's protection as such" (1994, p. 3). In the modern 
regime of authorship, the author is morally valorized as the solitary creator of unique and original 
work that embodies the author's unique experience and creative artistry in giving that experience 
aesthetic fOIID, whether it be in words, images or music. This moral evaluation of genuine 
authorship becomes legally enshrined in copyright law in the mid nineteenth century and has 
remained the dominant juridical definition of authorship, applicable to all forms of cultural 
production and intellectual property to this day, and not just to popular music and rock culture. In 
spite of the emergence and widespread. use of collaborative technologies of communication and 
cultural production, such as electronic sampling, hypertext and the Internet, as Woodmansee 
notes, "as creative production becomes more corporate, collective, and collaborative, the law 
invokes the Romantic author all the more insistently" (1994, p. 28). 
iEven the least subtle ofreaders ofInternet discussion groups like "alt.music.alternative" can not 
help but notice that a great deal of the discussion deal with authenticity in the Romantic sense 
based on songwriting ability, compatibility of "author's" life with song topics, and so forth. 
·jThis is not an attempt to revive the author after his/her death. We are not attempting to imply 
that we literally know their "'intentions"; we are only constructing a narrative out of their 
storytelling after the fact and out of our own "common sense" observations. 
hThat "'I Still Haven't Found What I am Looking For" was intended as a marker ofU2's rock and 
roll authenticity is amply demonstrated in their feature film, Rattle and Hum. In the film, the song is 
performed in "authentic" gospel style by a Harlem church chOir, thus affirming the band's status as 
authentic contemporary embodiment of rock and roll's roots in the African-American experience. 
7The fact that U2, as discrete individuals and as creators of the cultural commodity, were 
peripheral to the construction of authenticity and property right by legal discourse was under-
scored repeatedly as the case unfolded. Soon after the judgment was rendered, Negativland began 
to importune the band, its management., and associates such as producer Brian Eno to intervene on 
Negativland's behalf with Island Records. However, as Eno told them in a fax in November 1991, 
whatever sympathies U2 might have with their plight, there was little the band could do stop the 
machinery of juridical suppression of the single. He wrote "that I'm pretty sure that band wouldn't 
support this rather heavy-handed interference in what you are doing: apart from anything else 
their senses of humor and self-deprecation are completely intact and I think they would find the 
record pretty funny." However, as he reminded them, "you should realize that they don't control 
Island Records or Warner-Chappell" (Negativland, 1995, p. 31). Indeed, to U2's credit, it 
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apparently did pressure Island to back off from demanding damages from Negativland and SST. 
As Chris Blackwell, President of Island Records told Negativland in November of 1991, "I am 
getting a huge amount of hassle from the members ofU2 not to press for payment." He blamed the 
members Negativland themselves for their predicament by not requesting permission to sample 
the band's recording, and, since Island had already incurred costs of $55,000 in securing the law 
judgmen~ he declared that he was "not prepared to eat these legal fees" (Negativland, 1995, p. 32; 
emphasis in original), The subordinate status of U2 within the discursive realm of corporate 
sovereignty of the case was also reiterated in the only direct communication between the band and 
Negativland. In what was one of more entertaining episodes in the case, U2's guitarist, The Edge, 
was "ambushed" by Mark Hosler and Don Joyce under the guise of interview with Mondo 2000 
magazine about U2's Zoo TVtour inJune of 1992. The Edge was discussing the tour's innovative 
use of live audio~visual sampling of satellite transmissions with WIRED's editor, R. U. Sirius, when 
Hosler and Joyce jumped in to discuss the case. The Edge expressed regret for Negativland's 
predicament and said that if it had been up to the band, the whole situation would have worked out 
differently. Moreover, he argued, because of all the negative publicity in the music press 
smrounding the case, U2 was almost as much of a victim as Negativland. As he told Hosler and 
Joyce, "I know you have really taken a kicking and I'm sorry about how it has all come out, Island 
Records ham't been affected, but we have gotten so much shit in the media about this and it's really 
annoying' (Negativland, 1995, p. 91; emphasis in the original). Interestingly, in explaining U2's 
relative impotence to affect the case, the Edge ended up basically rearticulating the logic of 
restricted symbolic economy of the cultural commodity. "I don't imagine Island was upset about 
the sampling aspect of the record"; instead, it was its satirical subversion of its sovereignty over the 
authenticity of the commodity and its exploitation with which they were concerned. When asked 
by DonJoyce ifU2 couldn't put a provision in their contract allowing for fair and free sampling of 
their work no matter what the context, The Edge replied, "I am not sure we can make a judgment 
like that ... the deal that we have is that we sell or rent the use of copyrights to somebody else. That 
is the whole idea of having publishing and record deals. They have the right to exploit our 
work. ... They would see it in very simple terms as protecting their own property" (Negativland, 
1995, p. 89). Accordingly, the Edge argued, "although we would have reacted in a different way, 
the lawsuit wa.s not om lawsuit. Although we have some influence, we weren't in a position to tell 
Island Records what to do ... they weren't suing you on om behalf. They were suing you on their 
behalf' (Nega.tivland, 1995, pp. 84,91; emphasis original). Eventually, it should be noted, the 
combination of Negativland's persistence, a mountain of negative publicity in the musical and 
entertainment media, as well as pressure from U2, Island Records agreed to return the single and 
its copyright to Negativland. However, as we will discuss below, the intransigence ofeasey Kasem 
has blocked legal release of the single to this day. However, in keeping with the judgment of the 
cyberspace community, the single is available for downloading at the Negativland home page on 
the World Wide Web athttp://www.negativlandland.com. 
8For those interested in such details in all of their stunningly ironic glory, we suggest purchasing 
Negativland's own documentary history in Fair Use: The Story of the Letter U and the Numeral 2 
(I 995a). 
!IThe status of the "fair use" provision within copyright law is a complex issue and, although it 
formed an important part of the Negativland case, it is not our primary focus here (for reasons that 
will be made dear shortly). Basically, the "fair use provision" of the 1976 law establishes a "four 
factor" test for whether an appropriation of a copyrighted work can be considered to be fair use: 1) 
the purpose arid character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial or non-profit 
nature; 2) the nature of the copyrighted work (i.e., whether it is factual of fictional or published or 
unpublished); 3) the amount and substantiality of the appropriated portion in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; and 4) the effect of the use of copyrighted material upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work [see 17 U.S.C. §107 (1-4)]. For detailed discussion of 
the evolution of Fair Use as legal doctrine, especially in the context of sampling technology, see 
Jones (1995), Korn (1995) and Marcus (1995). Negativland also maintains a collection of resources 
on copyright, fair use and intellectual property issues on its World Wide Web site at http:// 
\vww.negativland.com/intprop.html. 
lOIn brief, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. involved a parody of the original Roy Orbison song, 
"Pretty Woman" by the rap group 2 Live Crew. The court found that the parody was an acceptable 
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fair use under the Copyright AcL In brieL using factors I, :1, and ·t of the Fair Use Provision. tilt" 
decision laid down several principles in considering whether an appropriation of a copyrighted 
work is to be considered fair use. According to Negativland (199Sb), these principles can be 
summarized as follows: the more the new work transforms either the material nature or symbolic 
meaning of the original, the more likely it is to be fair; the more the new work comments on the 
Oliginal in terms of critique, satire or parody, the more likely it is to be fair; the less of the original 
work thaI is taken or copied form the original, the more likely it is to be fair (although the court 
stressed that parodic appropriation, which depends upon the identification of the ori!:,rinal to work 
as parodic commentary, is likely to be given more leeway than other uses of appropriation!; thp 
less commercial and widely distributed the new work is, the more likely it is to be fair (although the 
commercial or non-commercial nature of the new work is not enough by itself !o determine 
whether or not it is fair use); and, finally, these principles are to be used to d~termin(' thp effect uf 
the lise on the market for the original. That is, the less the new work replaces the original in its own 
potential market, the more likely it is to be fair. The text olJustice Souter's opinion in the cas(~ call 
also be found in Negativland \ 1995a). To date, Camphell v. Acujf-Rose remains the govemmg casp m 
terms of copyright infringement and fair use in the field of music. ironically, had this decision been 
rendered before Island Records/Warner-Chappell Music sued Negativland and SST. it --;\'l'1l\\ 
likely that Negativland single would have been considered to be fair use unde-r Its prinCiples 
IINegativland's notion of appropriation as a dial0brical cultural practice obviously has deal 
resonances with the understanding of authorship and authenticity which characterizes Afrodia-
spork musical culture, particularly that of hip-hop. As Dick Hebdige has charactelized the reggae 
practice of "versioning," "Jt\, a democratic principle because no one ha'i tht' final ~ay. EVf'ryhody 
has a chance to make a contribution. And no one's version is treated as holy Writ" (1!)H7, p. 14'). 
Fot" Hebidge, the practice ofven;ioning in Afrodiasporic music-involves a logic of invocation and 
evocation where the referenced version of song, rifl~ lyric, rhythm takes on alternative lives and 
alternative meanings in uniquE' contexts. This practice of versioning, according to Potter (J 99H) 
and Rose (1994), is taken one step further in hip-hop with the fusion of AfnKf'ntric "signifyin· ,-
fomls of orality with sophisticated technologies of electronic reproduction, such as sampling, 
which create what Rose terms "post-literate orality" that enables a practice of relational and 
situational narrative originality. The point is not to invent a new story_ but tn tell a shar(>Q story lT1 a 
new way in a unique context so ib meaning is "fresh." This complex fusion of orality and 
postmodern technology (sampling) sustains collective memory and history and creales a self 
constructed identity that is resistive to the dominanl culture. According to Rose, sampling also 
creates collective memory through paying homage and respect (or disrespect) to musical and 
cultural predecessors, and thus embodies a principle of authorship that is communal rather than 
~ingular. Finally, in the context of Afrodiaspnric culture, sampling takes on a distinctive political 
valence of resistance and transgreSSion as a form of "sonic theft." Ro~e argues that sampling 
represents payback to record companies who have ripped off black music fOt" most of the twentieth 
century. For an analysis of the centrality of sampling to hip-hop, and manner in which it has come 
into conflict with the dominant leg-al discourse of authorship and property right see Marcu<; : 19~1:)). 
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